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DESIGNATION OF PARTIES 
For the sake of convenience, Appellees Safeco Insurance Company and American 
States Insurance Company will use the same designation for each party as set forth in 
Appellant Farr's Brief of Appellant, except that Appellees Safeco Insurance Company 
and American States Insurance Company will collectively be referred to as "Safeco." 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to UTAH CODE 
ANN. §78-2-20') (2000), and has authority to transfer this case pursuant to UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 78-2-2(4) (2000). This Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(j)(2000). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
The following issues are presented by the appeal: 
ISSUE NO. 1: Did the trial court properly grant Safeco's Motion for Summary 
Judgment based on the undisputed evidence that Andrew Reed - Farr's insurance agent 
and a captive Farmer's Insurance agent - was not an agent of Safeco when each and 
every claim asserted by Fair against Safeco was premised and dependent upon the 
following allegations: (a) There was an alleged commitment made by Farr's insurance 
agent (Reed) that Fan* would have "all necessary and appropriate insurance coverage for 
all of [Farr's] significant insurable risks"; and (b) Reed was allegedly acting as the agent 
for each of the Appellees? 
ISSUE NO. 2: Did the trial court properly rule that Safeco owed no duties to Fair 
beyond those set forth in the insurance contract which the undisputed evidence 
established were satisfied, and that Safeco did not act in bad faith? 
ISSUE NO. 3: Did the trial court properly rule that Farr's negligence claim failed 
as to Safeco because Safeco owed no duty to investigate, determine and advise Fair as to 
its insurable risks? 
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ISSUE NO. 4: Did the trial court properly grant Safeco's summary judgment 
motion on Fair's equitable estoppel claim as the undisputed evidence established there 
was no representation made by Safeco, nor was there any reliance by Fair on any alleged 
representation? 
Standard of Review for All Issues: Under Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, affidavits, depositions 
and admissions establish that there is no genuine issue regarding any material fact and the 
moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. Subsection (e) of Rule 
56 further provides: 
An adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his 
pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this 
rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for 
trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be 
entered against him. 
UTAH. R. CIV. P. 56(e). 
A trial court's granting of summary judgment is reviewed under a standard of correctness 
and no deference is accorded to the trial court's legal conclusions. E.g., Mills v. Brody, 
929 P.2d 360, 362 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This action is centered upon an equipment breakdown which resulted in a release 
of ammonia refrigerant which contaminated ice cream products being stored by Fair. 
Fair's insurance coverage limited losses for ammonia contamination for $25,000, the 
limit which Fan* had carried for years. 
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After this incident, Farr brought this action asserting claims against numerous 
defendants, including Safeco, alleging that they were responsible for this inadequate 
insurance coverage. The basis of each and every claim asserted by Farr was twofold: (1) 
There was an alleged commitment made by Farr's insurance agent, Appellee Andrew 
Reed, that Farr would have "all necessary and appropriate insurance coverage for all of 
[Farr's] significant insurable risks;" and (2) Andrew Reed was acting as the agent for 
each of the Appellees. The undisputed evidence established, however, that Andrew Reed, 
Farr Ice Cream's insurance agent and a captive Farmer's Insurance agent, was not an 
agent of Safeco; therefore, Safeco was entitled to summary judgment on Farr's claims. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BELOW 
The parties had completed significant discovery in the case and each of the parties, 
including Safeco, filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. On June 15, 2007, the Third 
District Court, Honorable Sandra N. Peuler presiding, issued a ruling whereby the court, 
inter alia, granted Safeco's Motion for Summary Judgment and denied Farr's Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment against Safeco. Farr timely filed this appeal. 
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STATEMENT OF PERTINENT FACTS 
The following facts were presented in support of Safeco's Motion for Summary 
Judgment and were uncontroverted: 
Appellant Asael Farr & Sons Company 
1. Farr manufactures, stores, distributes and markets high quality ice cream, 
soft serve ice cream mixes, and frozen desserts. [R. 293-294 at % 5] 
2. Farr has been in the ice cream business since 1929, more than seventy-five 
(75) years. [R. 1403 at^2, 1423] 
3. Dexter Fair has been the general manager of Farr for more than twenty-five 
(25) years, and is presently the Chairman of the Board. [R. 1403 at ^  3, 
1422] 
4. This action arises in connection with an ammonia leak incident that 
occurred on May 29, 2003 at Fair's cold storage warehouse facility at its 
Salt Lake location. In its Third Amended Complaint - the operative 
Complaint - Farr alleges that "an electric condenser fan motor accidentally 
sheared off its mount and severed an ammonia line thereby releasing 
ammonia that contaminated all of [Farr's] Products stored therein thereby 
rendering the same unmarketable and of no value." [R. 1403 at ^ f 4] 
5. At all relevant times Dexter Farr was the primary person responsible for 
procuring insurance coverage for Farr. Dexter Farr had performed that 
responsibility for the preceding twenty-five (25) to thirty (30) years. [R. 
1403 a t t 5, 1424] 
Farr's Equipment Breakdown Insurance Coverage Preceding the Loss 
6. For the policy year preceding the loss (i.e., May 14, 2002 to May 14, 2003), 
Farr was insured by Appellee Trinity Universal Insurance Company of 
Kansas (hereinafter "Trinity Policy"), and the insurance agent was Appellee 
Blackburn & Jones Company. [R. 1403 at ^  6, 1425] 
7. The Equipment Breakdown Coverage in the Trinity Policy provided a limit 
of $25,000 of coverage for the loss of Farr's perishable goods resulting 
from a release of ammonia. [R. 1403-1403 at^J7, 1426-1428, 1445-1451] 
8. In March 2003, Trinity notified Farr that the Trinity Policy would not be 
renewed and their coverage would cease on May 14, 2003. [R. 1404 at f 8, 
1429-1430] 
Farr's Attempt to Procure Replacement of Trinity Policy With Appellee Andrew 
Reed 
9. In March 2003, Farr, through its President Dexter Farr, began seeking 
replacement insurance coverage for the expiring Trinity Policy. [R. 1404 at 
119,1431-1433] 
10. Dexter Farr contacted or was contacted by several insurance agents to 
provide bids on Fair's insurance. [ R. 1404 at f 10] 
11. Dexter Farr provided these agents with information about the coverages and 
limits of the expiring Trinity Policy as Mr. Farr wanted to compare "apples 
to apples." This information included the $25,000 limit for the loss of 
Fair's perishable goods resulting from a release of ammonia discussed 
above. [R. 1404 at If 11, 1440-1441] 
12. Among the agents that Dexter Fair provided the information about prior 
coverages and limits was Appellee Reed. [R. 1404 at 1f 12] 
13. Appellee R.eed was a "captive agent" of Appellee Farmers. Mr. Reed 
testified that as a captive agent he "solely represented] Farmers Insurance 
Group." [R. 1404 at f 13, 1454] 
14. Mr. Reed had no authority to act for Safeco, nor did he have authority to 
bind Safeco. [R. 1405 atf 14, 1459-1460] 
15. Mr. Reed did not have any agency agreement with Safeco nor did he have 
authority to act as an agent for Safeco. [R. 1405 at If 15, 1454, 1460] 
16. Fair received several bids for insurance coverage from various agents 
including a proposal from Appellee Reed on behalf of Farmers. [R. 1405 at 
1f 16, 1431-1432] 
17. Also among those proposals was one from Appellee Blackburn & Jones on 
behalf of Safeco. That bid, however, was rejected by Farr because it was 
received after the deadline imposed by Dexter Farr. [R. 1405 at ^ f 17] 
18. The proposal submitted by Mr. Reed on behalf of Farmers was accepted by 
Farr because it had the lowest cost. [R. 1405 at f 18, 1433, 1435] 
19. Thereafter, however, Fanners declined to write the coverage. [R. 1405 at 
1fl9, 1455-1456] 
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Equipment Breakdown Coverage of $25,000 Provided by Safeco 
20. Mr. Reed began exploring other possibilities for placing Fair's property, 
liability and equipment breakdown insurance coverage including contacting 
Troy Granger of Appellee Trustco, Inc. to see if he could place the 
coverage. [R. 1406 at f 20] 
21. Trustco, Inc. was successful in binding Fair's property, liability and 
equipment breakdown coverage with Safeco effective May 23, 2003. [R. 
1406 at ^21] 
22. The Safeco policy provided Equipment Breakdown Coverage for the loss of 
perishable goods due to contamination from the release of ammonia with a 
limitation of $25,000. [R. 1406 at 122, 1463-1468] 
Farr Had No Communications Or Dealings With Safeco Prior to the Loss 
23. As of May 23, 2003, the date the coverage was bound with Safeco, Farr was 
not aware that the insurance was being placed with Safeco, nor had they had 
any conversations with anyone from Safeco. [R. 1406 at ^ f 23, 1442-1443] 
24. Fair has never had any communications with Trustco, Inc. who placed the 
insurance with Safeco. [R. 1406 at If 24, 1438-1439]1 
25. As set forth above, prior to the ammonia leak at issue in this litigation 
1
 Paragraph 64 of Fair's Statement of Facts further confirms that 
"Granger/Trustco/Safeco/American [States]/ Hartford did not directly communicate with Farr 
until after Fair's May 29, 2003 accident. Brief of Appellant p. 14 at If 64. 
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Appellee Reed never made any representations to the Farrs regarding 
Safeco and, more specifically, never made any representation as to the 
potential coverages under any Safeco insurance policy. [R. 1406 at f 25, 
1460] 
26. Moreover, prior to the ammonia leak Dexter Farr was not even aware that 
Safeco had any involvement in insuring Fair's Ice Cream. [R. 1407 at ^  26, 
1457-1458] 
The Ammonia Leak and Payment Under the Equipment Breakdown Coverage 
27. On May 29, 2003 there was an ammonia leak which contaminated the ice 
cream products being stored in the cold storage warehouse at Fair's Salt 
Lake facility. [R. 300-301, 1407 at ^  27] 
28. Following the ammonia leak, Farr notified Safeco that the loss had 
occurred. [R. 301, 1407 at1J 28] 
29. Safeco has paid Farr the $25,000 policy limit for ammonia contamination of 
Fair's products. [R. 1407 at ^  29, 1470-1472] 
Farr's Claims Against Safeco 
30. Farr asserted various causes of action against Safeco all of which were 
based on various representations purportedly made by Reed, the Farmer's 
insurance agent who dealt with Fair, as alleged in paragraph 21 of 
Plaintiffs Third Amended Complaint: 
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On and before May 14, 2003, Reed, while acting both for himself 
and as the duly authorized agent for TIE, Trustco, Safeco, American, 
Hartford, Kirchen, Central Agency, Central Bonds and Auto-Owners 
("Primary Defendants"), had received payment for and affirmatively 
represented to plaintiff (a) that the Primary Defendants had duly 
bound and provided plaintiff with all necessary and appropriate 
insurance coverage for all of plaintiff s significant insurable risks, 
including all insurable risks related to Plaintiffs Products, and (b) 
that the Primary Defendants, and each, of them had agreed, 
committed, and became jointly obligated to provide plaintiff with all 
such necessary, available and appropriate insurance coverage for all 
of Plaintiff s Products and all of plaintiff s significant insurable risks 
("Reed's Commitment"), effective May 14, 2003. 
[R. 299 at f 21] 
Fair's causes of action were based exclusively on "Reed's Commitment" as 
set forth in the preceding paragraph. For instance, Fair's breach of contract 
claim was based on an allegation of a "material and cardinal breach of the 
affirmative obligations owed by [defendants] to plaintiff under and in 
connection with Reed's Commitment." [R. 306 at f 41, 1408 at ^  31] 
Likewise, Fair's equitable estoppel claim was based exclusively upon the 
foregoing representations by Reed such as the allegation that "[t]he 
affirmative representations that were made and given by Reed... that are 
referred to in Paragraph 21 above [i.e., Reed's Commitment] were 
reasonably relied upon by [Fair]. [R. 308 at f 50, 1408 at f 32] 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED 
SAFECO'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON 
SEVERAL INDEPENDENT BASES 
Fair's claims were all predicated on the allegation that Reed, the captive Farmer's 
agent, made certain commitments and owed certain duties to Farr, and that Reed was the 
agent of and acting on behalf of all defendants at the time. The undisputed evidence 
establishes, however, that Reed had no authority to act on behalf of Safeco and did not 
purport to act on behalf of Safeco. Additionally, Reed never made any reference to 
Safeco during his discussions with Farr, Farr had no discussions with Safeco nor was Farr 
even aware that Safeco was involved in insuring Farr until after the loss. 
Fair's breach of contract claim based solely on an alleged "material and cardinal 
breach of the affirmative obligations owed by [Appellees] to [Fair] under and in 
connection with Reed's Commitment" failed for these same reasons. Moreover, the 
undisputed evidence is that Safeco fully complied with all of its obligations under the 
insurance policy. 
Fair's negligence claim against Safeco fails because Safeco did not owe any duty 
to Farr to investigate, determine or advise Farr as to its insurable risks. Farr had no 
contact with Safeco in connection with the procurement of insurance, and there is no legal 
authority for the proposition that an insurer has an obligation to evaluate and ascertain the 
insurable risks of each of its insureds. 
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Fair's bad faith claim failed because the Farr's loss claim was properly adjusted. 
Additionally, the bad faith claim as to Safeco necessarily failed because it was Hartford, 
not Safeco, that adjusted the claim. 
Farr's estoppel claim also failed as there was no representation made to Farr by 
Safeco, nor did Farr rely on any purported statement because Farr was not even aware that 
Safeco was involved in insuring Farr until after the ammonia leak. 
2. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED FARR'S 
MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON 
LIABILITY ISSUES 
Farr's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Liability Issues was based entirely 
on new theories of liability that were not pleaded in any complaint nor raised at any time 
prior to the summary judgment motions themselves. Given that the parties had engaged 
in substantial discovery based on the serious claims and allegations raised by Farr in its 
pleadings, it would have been patently unfair and improper to consider these newly raised 
claims and theories. Thus, Farr's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment was properly 
denied on that ground. 
Additionally, Farr's newly raised claims failed as they were not supported by the 
evidence or the law. Farr's Motion asked the trial court to find as a matter of law that an 
insurer such as Safeco - who had no contact with Farr at any time prior to binding the 
insurance, the incident, or issuance of the policy - owed an absolute duty to determine all 
of a prospective insured's insurance needs. Moreover, it would have required a finding 
by the trial court that Safeco bound unlimited insurance coverage for Farr's losses. That 
11 
is not the law and such a ruling would have been improper. Instead, the plain and 
unambiguous language of the policy, which contained common provisions and 
limitations, limited Fair's coverage for ammonia contamination to $25,000. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED SAFECO'S 
MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON 
SEVERAL INDEPENDENT BASES 
There are several independent bases which support the trial court's ruling granting 
summary judgment in favor of Safeco. They are addressed in turn. 
1. Farr's Claims Against Safeco Fail As Reed Was Not An Agent of 
Safeco 
It is undisputed that Fair's causes of action against Safeco for breach of contract, 
negligence, and estoppel are all centered on Fair's unsupportable allegation that Appellee 
Reed was acting as an agent of, inter alia, Safeco when he purportedly made "Reed's 
Commitment" set forth in paragraph 30 of the Statement of Pertinent Facts, supra.2 [See 
Third Amended Complaint, R. 299 at \ 21] The undisputed evidence in this case 
however, establishes that Reed was not acting as Safeco's agent during his dealings with 
Fair. 
Utah law unequivocally requires that "[t]o be an agent, a person must be 
authorized by another to 'act on his behalf and subject to his control.'" Ivie v. Hickman, 
2
 It should be noted that Fair's allegations actually lumped all defendants together 
and claim that Reed was an agent for all defendants when he allegedly made these 
representations to Fair on or before May 14, 2003. [See R. 299 at f 21] 
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2004 UT App 469, f 11, 105 P.3d 946 (citing Gildea v. Guardian Title Co. of Utah, 970 
P.2d 1265, 1269 (Utah 1998)(quoting Restatement (Second) of Agency § 1 (1958)). The 
undisputed evidence in this case established that Reed was not authorized to act on behalf 
of Safeco, nor was Reed subject to its control. Moreover, it was undisputed that during 
all of Reed's dealings with Farr it is undisputed that Reed was a "captive agent" of 
Farmers and, as such, he solely represented Farmers. [Statement of Pertinent Fact no. 13] 
Additionally, Reed testified that he had no authority to act for Safeco, nor did he have 
authority to bind Safeco. [Statement of Pertinent Fact no. 14] The undisputed evidence 
further established that Reed did not have any agency agreement with Safeco nor did he 
have authority to act as an agent for Safeco. [Statement of Pertinent Fact no. 15] Thus, 
there simply could be no finding that Reed was acting as agent for Safeco and summary 
judgment was proper. E.g., Vina v. Jefferson Ins. Co. of New York, 761 P.2d 581, 586 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988)(salesman who procured insurance for insured was not agent for 
insurers under insurance statute or common-law). 
The Vina case is very similar to the case at bar and this Court's ruling in Vina is 
very instructive. In Vina, the insured contacted Dunn, a licensed insurance agent and 
broker, to discuss procuring insurance for insured's business which was being subleased. 
Vina, 761 P.2d at 583. After discussing the type and amount of insurance coverage 
desired, the insurance agent obtained a quote for the insurance through Transwestern 
Agency with Jefferson Insurance Company as the insurer. Id. The insurance was placed 
with those entities. Id. A couple of years later, the business owner contacted Dunn and 
cancelled the insurance without notifying the sublessee of the business. Id. Shortly 
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thereafter the business, including the sublessee's property, was destroyed by fire. Id. 
The sublessee sued both the insurance agency and the insurer claiming that their 
agent, the insurance agent Dunn, had improperly cancelled the insurance policy without 
the sublessee's knowledge or consent. Id. at 584. The trial court rejected the argument 
that Dunn, the insurance agent, was an agent for the insurer and found instead that he was 
actually an agent of the insureds in their procurement of insurance. Id. 
This Court affirmed the trial court's ruling and held that the insurance agent was 
acting as an agent for the insureds and not the insurer. 
... [Insureds] gave [agent] discretion to choose an insurance policy for them 
based on the best price he could find. [Agent] was unable to obtain the desired 
policy from any of the companies for whom he was a licensed insurance agent 
and, as a result, contacted Transwestern. However, unlike Farrington^ there 
was no evidence that he had prior dealings with Transwestern.3 [Agent] 
received a premium quote from Transwestern and communicated it to 
[insureds], and they authorized him to secure the insurance policy. [Agent] 
procured insurance for [insureds] both before and after the loss occurred in this 
matter, none of it through Transwestern or Jefferson... .Furthermore, the facts 
do not indicate that Transwestern or Jefferson authorized [agent] to act for 
them to any significant degree, except to perform ministerial acts. He could 
not act on their behalf to establish or alter the business relationship between 
[insurer] and [insured]. Therefore, the trial court's finding that [agent] was 
not the agent of [broker] or [insurer], but the agent of [insured], when he 
cancelled the policy is not clearly erroneous.... 
Vina, 761 P.2d at 586 (emphases added). 
Virtually identical to the Vina case, Farr made it clear to Reed that they were 
interested in obtaining the best possible price for their insurance. [Statement of Pertinent 
Fact no. 18] Also, Mr. Reed was unable to place the coverage with his own company, 
3
 That is the same situation at issue in this case as the evidence established that Mr. 
Reed had not had any prior dealings with Trustco or Safeco. 
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Farmers, with which he was a captive agent, so he contacted Trustco who in turn 
contacted Safeco. [Statement of Pertinent Facts nos. 13 & 20] Reed did not have any 
agency agreement with Safeco, had no authority to bind Safeco, and could not act as an 
agent on behalf of Safeco. [Statement of Pertinent Facts nos. 14 & 15] Based on these 
undisputed facts, Farr could not meet its burden of establishing that Mr. Reed was acting 
as an agent for Safeco and, therefore, Safeco's Motion for Summary Judgment was 
properly granted. 
Neither could Farr meet its burden of establishing some type of implied or 
apparent agency Under Utah law an agency based on apparent authority requires that the 
principal engage in conduct such that a third person is led to believe that the agent has 
authority to act for the principal. As this Court stated in Bodell Constr. Co. v. Stewart 
Title Guar. Co., 945 P.2d 119, 124 (Utah Ct. App. 1997): 
"[A]n agent's apparent... authority flows only from the acts and conduct of the 
principal. Zions First Nat'l Bank v. Clark Clinic Corp., 762 P.2d 1090, 1095 (Utah 
1988). u[T]he authority of the agent [is not] [sic] 'apparent' merely because it 
looks so to the person with whom he deals. It is the principal who must cause third 
parties to believe that the agent is clothed with apparent authority.... It follows 
that one who deals exclusively with an agent has the responsibility to ascertain that 
agent's authority despite the agent's representations.''/^/, (quoting City Electric v. 
Dean Evans Chrysler-Plymouth 672 P.2d 89, 90 (Utah 1983)). 
There is no evidence upon which to find that Reed was Safeco's implied or apparent 
agent given that Farr never had any contact with Safeco prior to the loss and was not even 
aware that Safeco was involved in insuring Farr until after the loss. [Statement of 
Pertinent Facts nos. 23 & 26] Moreover, it is undisputed that Reed never represented that 
15 
he was acting as an agent for Safeco, nor did he make any reference to Safeco or any 
potential coverages under any Safeco insurance policy. [Statement of Pertinent Fact no. 
25] In fact, Dexter Farr was not even aware that Safeco had provided any insurance until 
after the incident. Based on the foregoing, the trial court properly determined that Reed 
did not have any apparent authority to act on behalf of Safeco was proper. 
2. Fair's Breach of Contract and Bad Faith Claims Against Safeco Failed 
As There Was No Evidence That Safeco Breached Any Contract Or 
Acted in Bad Faith 
Fair's Breach of Contract Claim was based exclusively on Reed's Commitment 
and the allegation that there was a "material and cardinal breach of the affirmative 
obligations owed by [Appellees] to [Farr] under and in connection with Reed's 
Commitment." [Third Amended Complaint, R. 306 at 141] Farr's Third Amended 
Complaint alleged that Reed's Commitment was the assertion by Reed that effective May 
14, 2003 Reed would "provide [Farr] with all necessary and appropriate insurance 
coverage for all of [Farr's] significant insurable risks, including all insurable risks related 
to [Farr's] Products." [Third Amended Complaint, R. 299 at f 21]4 Farr's breach of 
4
 The Third Amended Complaint - which was the operative complaint in this action 
and the pleading under which the parties engaged in extensive discovery including numerous 
depositions - based all of its claims entirely on "Reed's Commitment" and the allegation that 
Reed was acting on behalf of the various defendants including Safeco. As discussed more fully 
below in this Brief, it was not until after the discovery had been done and motions for summary 
judgment were filed that F a i r e r the first time, raised the argument that about an oral insurance 
binder and the ambiguities in the policy. Neither the Third Amended Complaint nor any of the 
prior complaints had mentioned or referenced any insurance binder (oral or otherwise) or made 
any challenges to the policy language applicable to this loss. Accordingly, the trial court properly 
limited the summary judgment motions to the allegations and theories advanced by Farr during 
the several years this case was pending and upon which the significant discovery had been 
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contract claim against Safeco which is based on Reed's Commitment fails for several 
reasons. 
Farr's breach of contract claim against Safeco failed first and foremost because, as 
set forth above, Reed was not Safeco's agent when he purportedly made the Commitment. 
Reed has never had any agency agreement or authority to act on behalf of Safeco. There 
simply is no evidence upon which a showing could be made that Reed was acting as an 
agent of Safeco at the time he purportedly made this Commitment to Fair.5 
Second, assuming arguendo that there was evidence to support a finding that Reed 
was acting as an agent of Safeco when he made the alleged Commitment, it is undisputed 
that prior to the loss Reed never made any representations to the Fairs regarding Safeco 
including any statement as to the potential coverages under any Safeco Policy. Moreover, 
prior to the ammonia leak the Fairs were not even aware that insurance was being placed 
with Safeco, nor had they ever had any conversations with anyone from Safeco. Thus, the 
purported "Reed's Commitment" upon which the breach of contract claim was based did 
not even reference or pertain to Safeco or its insurance policy; therefore, there can be no 
breach of that purported Commitment or bad faith. 
completed. 
5
 Interestingly, Farr's Third Amended Complaint specifically alleged that Reed's 
Commitment was made on or before May 14, 2003. It is undisputed that as of May 14, 2003 it 
was believed that either Farmers or Auto-Owners was going to place Farr's insurance. It was not 
until after this date that Safeco was even approached by Trustco to place this insurance; 
therefore, Farr's allegation that Reed's Commitment was made on or before May 14, 2003 
further precludes any finding that Reed was acting as Safeco's agent when the alleged 
commitment was made. 
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Fair also argues that Safeco is responsible for Reed's Commitment under UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 31 A-23a-405 which provides that: 
There is a rebuttable presumption that every insurer is bound by any act of its 
appointed licensee performed in this state that is within the scope of the licensee's 
actual (express or implied) or apparent authority. 
That argument again fails because, as discussed in great detail above, the undisputed 
evidence is that Reed was not acting as Safeco's agent. In addition, Reed has never been 
an appointed licensee of Safeco and, therefore, that provision simply is not applicable. 
Finally, Fair argues under Point III of its Brief that Safeco is responsible for 
Reed's Commitment because Safeco somehow ratified Reed's Commitment. That 
argument - which was not raised in the trial court and is improperly being raised for the 
first time on appeal - also fails: 
Under Utah law, [a] principal may impliedly or expressly ratify an agreement made 
by an unauthorized agent." Bradshaw v. McBride, 649 P.2d 74, 78 (Utah 1982). 
"However, a ratification requires the principal to have knowledge of all material 
facts and an intent to ratify." Id. "[T]he same kind of authorization that is required 
to clothe an agent initially with authority to contract must be given by the principal 
to constitute a ratification of an unauthorized act. Id. at 79. 
Wasatch Oil & Gas, LLC v. Reott, 2007 UT App 223, f 30 n. 13, 163 P.3d 713 (emphases 
added). 
Based on all of the foregoing, Fan* cannot maintain a breach of contract action 
based on the purported representation made by Reed during the procurement of the 
insurance and Safeco's Motion for Summary Judgment was properly granted. 
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3. Farr's Negligence Claim Against Safeco Failed As Safeco Owed No 
Duty To Investigate, Determine and Advise Farr As To Its Insurable 
Risks 
Fair's negligence claim, as explained in paragraph 24 of the Third Amended 
Complaint, alleged that "[i]n connection with and as a consequence of Reed's 
Commitment," the defendants owed Farr the following duties: 
a) to investigate and determine the full nature and extent of each and all of 
[Fair's] insurable risks, and to advise [Fair] of the same; 
b) to investigate and determine the nature and extent of insurance coverage 
available to cover such risks and the cost thereof, and to fully advise [Fair] 
of the same; and 
c) to insure [Farr] was fully informed and provided with all of such coverage, 
or to confirm in writing [Fair's] decision not to obtain such insurance. 
[Third Amended Complaint, R 300 at If 24 ] 
Fair's negligence claim failed as the undisputed evidence established that Reed was not 
acting as an agent for Safeco when he made the Commitment upon which the negligence 
claim is based. Additionally, the Commitment did not reference Safeco, nor did Reed 
ever make any representations as to the potential coverages under any Safeco insurance 
policy. 
Fair's negligence claim also failed because Safeco did not owe any of the duties 
upon which the negligence claim was based. There simply was no authority for Farr's 
assertion that the insurer has some obligation to evaluate and ascertain the insurable risks 
of each of its insureds. If that were the case, then every insurance company or broker that 
was ever involved in insuring Farr in prior years when its equipment breakdown 
coverage limit was even less than what it was at the time of the accident would bear some 
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responsibility to Farr. Such a duty does not simply arise automatically in connection with 
an insurance contract. 
The conclusion that Safeco did not owe any of these duties to Farr is further 
dictated by the fact that Farr did not have any contact with Safeco in connection with the 
insurance procurement process, Farr did not even know that Safeco was involved in the 
insuring of its facilities, and Safeco was not contacted regarding this insurance until 
immediately before coverage was bound. 
Based on the foregoing, Farr could not and did not meet its burden of proof to 
establish a duty and breach of duty by Safeco; therefore, Safeco's Motion for Summary 
Judgment was properly granted. 
4. Fair's Equitable Estoppel Claim Against Safeco Failed As A Matter Of 
Law 
Fair's equitable estoppel claim, like all of its other claims, is based on Reed's 
Commitment to Plaintiff: 
50. The affirmative representations that were made and given by Reed, acting for 
and on behalf of the Primary Defendants, that are referred to in paragraph 21 
above [Reed's Commitment] were reasonably relied upon by plaintiff. 
[Third Amended Complaint, R. 308 at ^  50] 
To prevail on its equitable estoppel claim, Farr must prove the following three (3) 
elements: "1) an admission, statement, or act inconsistent with the claim afterwards 
asserted; 2) action by the other party on the faith of such admission, statement, or act; and 
3) injury to such party resulting from allowing the first party to contradict or repudiate 
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such admission, statement, or act." Celebrity Club, Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control Comm'n, 
602 P.2d 689, 694 (Utah 1979). Farr cannot meet these elements. 
Safeco did not make any statement to Farr, and the statements by Reed are not 
sufficient because, as discussed above in significant detail, Reed did not have authority 
and was not acting as an agent of Safeco when the alleged statements were made. 
Moreover, Reed never made any statements regarding Safeco, or the scope or amount of 
its insurance coverage. Thus, the first element for an estoppel claim was not satisfied. 
Additionally, the reliance element is not satisfied as to Safeco given that Farr was 
not even aware that Safeco was involved in insuring Farr until after the ammonia leak. 
Perhaps more important, the undisputed evidence established that Farr accepted Reed's 
proposal because it had the best price, not because of the coverage so there was no 
reliance on Reed's purported commitment. That is proven not only by Dexter Farr's 
testimony, but also the fact that the coverage for the ammonia leak under the Safeco 
policy was the exact same amount of coverage that Farr had the preceding year. Thus, 
Farr cannot establish that it relied on any representation by Reed regarding the scope and 
amount of coverage of the Safeco policy, even if there were evidence that any such 
representation was made. 
For the foregoing reasons, Farr's equitable estoppel claim against Safeco failed as 
a matter of law. 
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II. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED FARR'S 
MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON 
LIABILITY ISSUES 
1. Farr's Summary Judgment Motion Was Properly Denied As It Was 
Based Entirely On New Theories That Were Not Raised in Farr's 
Pleadings 
Farr's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment asked the trial court to rule as a 
matter of law that: 1) Safeco "orally bound property damage coverage for Fair with no 
'ammonia contamination', 'equipment breakdown'/other inventory/related loss 
exclusion/limitation," and 2) the insurance policy issued by Safeco is ambiguous and 
must be construed to "provide full coverage [i.e., no limitations or exclusions] for Farr's 
damages." Neither of these claims or theories was raised by Farr at any time prior to 
Farr's Motion. 
For instance, there is no mention of the insurance binder anywhere in any of Farr's 
several complaints including, but not limited to, the Third Amended Complaint which 
was the operative complaint in this action. Instead, each and every claim asserted by Farr 
in this action was based on the purported "Reed's Commitment" made to Farr by Mr. 
Reed, the captive Farmer's agent. Nor was there any claim or mention that the Safeco 
insurance policy's exclusions and limitations - which are customary in the industry and, 
in fact, were included in Farr's prior insurance coverages - must be disregarded. The trial 
court properly rejected these newly concocted claims and theories on the ground they 
were not raised in the pleadings and had never before been asserted in this action during 
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the three (3) years it was pending. A plaintiff such as Farr is not allowed to file a 
complaint setting forth certain theories, allow significant discovery to occur based on 
those allegations, and then change the entire nature of its claims when it becomes clear 
they cannot defeat a summary judgment motion.6 See, e.g., Coleman v. Quaker Oats Co., 
2323 F.3d 1271, 1291092 (9th Cir. 2000)(Plaintiff s claims properly dismissed when 
theory of liability was not set forth in complaint and was raised for time in response to 
summary judgment motion.); Josey v. John R. Holingworth Corp., 996 F.2d 632, 641-42 
(3d Cir. 1993)(same). 
2. Farr's Summary Judgment Motion Was Properly Denied As The 
Binder Did Not Provide For Unlimited Coverage For Ammonia 
Contamination Losses 
Even if Farr was allowed to rely on its untimely raised theories of liability, there 
was no factual or legal basis for ruling, as Farr argues, that as a result of Reed's oral 
binder Farr had unlimited coverage with no exclusions or limitations. To the contrary, the 
binder as a matter of law incorporated the terms of the policy subsequently issued by 
Safeco, including the coverage limitation of $25,000 for the incident at issue in this case. 
Farr is correct in its assertion that the Utah Insurance Code specifically authorizes 
oral binders of property insurance coverage. UTAH CODE ANN. §31 A-21-102. The Utah 
6
 Farr claims that this deficiency is allowed because the pleadings were sufficient to 
provide "notice" to Appellees of Farr's claims. However, a reading of the various complaints 
filed by Fair, including the operative Third Amended Complaint, show otherwise. Farr's claims 
have always been based exclusively upon Reed's Commitment and the alleged breach of that 
commitment. Farr's attempt to entirely change their claims in this case after years of discovery 
would be unfair and is not allowed even under the "notice" pleading concept. 
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Insurance Code further provides that a binder "temporarily binds insurance coverage 
pending the issuance of an insurance policy." Id. at (1). The terms and provisions of 
coverage provided under a binder are those terms and provisions of the contemplated 
policy: "The terms and provisions which control in the construction of coverage afforded 
by a binder are those contained in the ordinary form of policy usually issued by the 
company at the time upon similar risks. The binder is subject to the conditions of the 
policy contemplated though such policy may never issue " 12A John A. Appleman & 
Jean Appleman, Insurance Law & Practice § 7232, at 179-83 (1981). As Couch on 
Insurance indicates, "a binder contemplates a subsequent and more formal agreement, 
and by its nature encompasses the terms of the prospective policy whether those terms are 
prescribed by law or are part of the customary policy issued by the insurer." 1A Lee R. 
Russ & Thomas F. Segalla, Couch on Insurance § 13:1 (3d ed. 2006). In addition, courts 
faced with the issue have regularly held that the binder incorporates by implication all of 
the terms of the policy to be issued. E.g., Unigard Sec. Ins. Co. v. Mission Ins. Co. Trust, 
12 P.3d 296, 299 (Colo. Ct. App. 2000)("Absent an express agreement to the contrary, a 
binder incorporates the terms of the contemplated policy."); Statewide Ins. Corp. v. 
Dewar, 69A P.2d 1167, 1170 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984)("The binder incorporates by 
implication all of the terms of the policy to be issued."); Matousek v. S.D. Farm Bureau 
Mut. Ins. Co., 450 N.W.2d 236, 238 (S.D. 1990)("The terms and provisions which control 
in the construction of coverage afforded by a binder are those contained in the ordinary 
form of policy usually issued by the company at that time upon similar risks."). Based on 
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the foregoing legal authorities, the binder issued by Safeco incorporated the terms of the 
subsequently issued policy which limited coverage for this aspect of Fair's loss to 
$25,000. 
Fair's assertion that the parties had a contract whereby Safeco somehow agreed to 
cover all of Farr's losses without limitation - which was raised for the first time at the 
time of Fair's Motion for Summary Judgment after the case had been pending for 
approximately three (3) years - fails as a matter of law. First and foremost, Farr could not 
meet its burden of establishing a contract because it never had any discussions with 
Safeco (or anyone Farr even claims was Safeco's agent) at the time the insurance was 
bound. It is undisputed that Safeco had no contact with anyone from Farr prior to the 
incident at issue. In fact, Mr. Dexter Farr testified during his deposition that he was not 
even aware that Safeco was the insurer at the time of the incident. Moreover, it is 
undisputed that no one from Farr had any contact with Trustco or Mr. Granger prior to the 
incident. Thus, there simply can be no showing there was the contract as now suggested 
by Farr.7 
7
 Because of the fact there was no pre-loss communication between anyone from 
Farr and Safeco or Trustco, Fair's reliance on Harris v. Albrecht, 86 P.3d 728 (Utah 2004) is 
even more curious. The Utah Supreme Court in Harris found in that case there was no oral 
contract between the insurance agent and his customer even though Albrecht had issued several 
policies for Harris, Harris specifically requested to obtain insurance for a business owned by 
Harris, and Albrecht indicated he would take care of it. In the instant case, there is no 
communication between Safeco or Trustco with anyone for Farr at any time prior to the loss. 
Accordingly, there simply can be no oral contract for the procurement of insurance for Farr. 
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Second, the communications which Farr purports gave rise to the contract do not 
demonstrate any meeting of the minds that Safeco would be bound for any and all losses 
without limitation as alleged by Farr. Farr relies on statements between Trustco and 
Safeco - neither of which had any communications with Farr when the insurance was 
bound - wherein Trustco asked that the coverage be bound effective May 23, 2003, and 
they would like to go "with all coverages." Those conversations, even if Farr was a party 
to them, do not prove the contract alleged by Farr that Safeco was insuring Farr for any 
and all losses without limitation. To the contrary, those conversations contemplated 
immediate binding of coverage and it is undoubted that they were anticipating the usual 
and customary policy terms to be included in this transaction. They clearly were not 
expecting that the insurance being issued would have no limitations, exclusions or 
exceptions whatsoever which is the position espoused by Farr (at the very least this would 
be a question of fact precluding summary judgment in Fair's favor). 
Finally, it must be remembered that both the Trinity insurance policy under which 
Farr was insured the year prior to the incident and the insurance policy proposed by 
Farmer's insurance in 2003 that Dexter Farr testified he thought was the applicable policy 
at the time of the incident contained coverage of $25,000 for the type of loss at issue in 
this lawsuit. With respect to the Farmer's proposal which Reed and Mr. D. Farr discussed 
at length when this insurance was being placed, the proposal expressly set forth a $25,000 
limit for Spoilage/Temperature Change. [R. 2348-2363]. After setting forth that limit, 
the Farmer's proposal went on to specifically describe this coverage limitation as follows: 
26 
Spoilage Temperature Change: Optional on Primary, Premier pays up to 
$25.000. Pays for damage to insureds [sic] personal property resulting from 
mechanical breakdown or f ilure of refrigerating equipment, contamination by 
refrigerant or power outages beyond the insureds [sic] control. Optional higher 
limits available. (Emphases added). 
Farr argued that this provision is somehow unclear or ambiguous even though it clearly 
spelled out in specific detail the coverage limitations. Fair also attempted to claim that it 
was misleading because there was coverage for Machinery and Equipment Breakdown in 
higher amounts. However that coverage, as explained on the following page of the 
Farmer's proposal, specifically indicates it would not apply to the claim at issue as it: 
Pays for direct damage to insured's machinery and equipment resulting from 
mechanical breakdown electrical current or arcing or explosion of steam boilers. 
Also covers loss of business income resulting from equipment damage. 
[R. 2356] 
Thus, the only insurance coverages proposed by Reed to Farr - and the policy that Fan-
actually thought was in place at the time of the incident - set forth the same coverages as 
contained in the Safeco policy that was issued. Thus, the Safeco policy and the standard 
coverage limitations set forth therein, including the $25,000 limit at issue in this case, is 
enforceable and was not breached. Farr cannot establish that these discussions and course 
of conduct somehow resulted in a contract between the parties whereby it was agreed that 
unlimited insurance for any cause of action resulted; Accordingly, Fair's breach of 
contract claim fails and the trial court properly denied Fair's Motion.8 
8
 Farr spends a good deal of its Brief arguing that insurance licensees - which would not 
include Safeco but may include Messrs. Reed and Granger - cannot make any false or misleading 
statements to prospective insureds. Obviously Mr. Granger, the only individual even arguably 
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Fair's final argument is that Safeco is estopped from asserting any limitation on 
coverage under the doctrine of promissory estoppel. To prevail on its promissory 
estoppel argument, Farr must prove the following three (3) elements: "1) an admission, 
statement, or act inconsistent with the claim afterwards asserted; 2) action by the other 
party on the faith of such admission, statement, or act; and 3) injury to such party 
resulting from allowing the first party to contradict or repudiate such admission, 
statement, or act." Celebrity Club, Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control Conim'n, 602 P.2d 689, 
694 (Utah 1979). Farr cannot meet these elements as it is undisputed that Safeco did not 
make any statement to Farr at any time prior to the loss. Moreover, there is no evidence 
that any statement was made regarding the coverages to be provided by Safeco because 
Farr never discussed Safeco with anyone during this time frame. In fact, Farr was not 
even aware that American States or Safeco was involved in insuring Farr until after the 
incident. Thus, the first element for an estoppel claim is not satisfied. Additionally, the 
reliance element is not satisfied as to Safeco given that Farr was not even aware that 
Safeco was involved in insuring Farr until after the ammonia leak. Perhaps most 
important, the undisputed evidence is that Farr accepted Reed's proposal because it had 
the best price, not because of the coverage so there was no reliance on Reed's purported 
commitment. That is proven not only by Dexter Fair's testimony, but also the fact that 
acting as an agent of Safeco, did not violate this provision as he had no communications with 
anyone from Farr when the insurance was bound. Accordingly, there is no basis for the argument 
that Safeco is precluded from enforcing the provisions of its policy because it violated these 
provisions relating exclusively to producers/licensees. 
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the coverage for the ammonia leak under the Safeco policy was the exact same amount of 
coverage that Fair had the preceding year. Thus, Fair cannot establish that it relied on 
any representation by Reed regarding the scope and amount of coverage of the Safeco 
policy, even if there was evidence that any such representation was made. 
3. Farr's Summary Judgment Motion Was Properly Denied As to Safeco 
As It Is Undisputed That Hartford, Not Safeco, Adjusted the Claim 
Finally, Farr's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment asked the trial court to rule 
as a matter of law that Safeco acted in bad faith and should be held responsible for Farr's 
attorney's fees and costs because of the post-loss handling of the claim. That would be 
improper for several reasons. First, as set forth above, the claim was handled properly 
given the insurance coverage obtained by Fair. 
Second, even assuming that Farr's position is correct, under Utah law an insurer 
does not act in bad faith by denying a debatable claim submitted by an insured. See 
Billings v. Union Bankers Ins. Co., 918 P.2d 461, 465 (Utah 1996)(Insurer that takes 
position on insured's claim that is fairly debatable (i.e., there is bona fide question about 
obligations) cannot be held to have breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing.); see also Prince v. Bear River Mut. Ins. Co, 56 P.3d 524, 533 (Utah 2002)("The 
denial of a claim is reasonable if the insured's claim is fairly debatable."). 
Third, attorney's fees would not be recoverable in any event. The cases relied on 
by Fair in its summary judgment motion appear to all involve recovery of fees as 
consequential damages when an injured party is forced into litigation with a third-party. 
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Under that circumstance, such fees may be recoverable but that situation is not involved 
here. 
Fourth and finally, Safeco cannot be held responsible for bad faith to Farr as it is 
undisputed that the Farr's claim was investigated and adjusted by Hartford pursuant to its 
reinsurance agreement with Safeco. Thus, this claim based on improper adjustment must 
necessarily be directed at Hartford and Safeco cannot be held liable under these 
circumstances. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Safeco requests that this Court affirm the trial court's 
granting Safeco's Motion for Summary Judgment and denying Farr's Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment. 
DATED this 19th day of March, 2008. 
MORGAN, MINNOCK, RICE & JAMES, L.C. 
Jonathan L. 
Attorneys for Safeco Insurance'Company of America 
and American States Insurance Company 
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